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“Success in Banking is attained not by avoiding risk but by effectively selecting and managing risk”
ABSTRACT
There is empirical evidence, which justifies the core functioning of money in economic growth
and the development of a State, which equally establishes the reason for the relevant role of
Banks to every economy. The underpinning of this research, is to present the necessity for the
financial industry of undeveloped and developing economies very fragile in their functioning, to
adopt the proposed theoretical perspective of dynamic credit risk analysis and lending, as a
proposed upgrade model over the existing static risk analytical approach, found to be ineffective
in credit-lending-support to the productiveness of enterprises, emerging from such economies,
hence creating frustration to the welfare nature of the State and heightening it unemployment
tension.
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21. INTRODUCTION
In other, for the paper to deeply establish the bases of its argument, with the quality submission
of theoretical-model-analysis. Some relevant terminology used herein, lacking precise definition
in the taxonomy of economic science, has to be defined in the context of this paper based on
critical assessment of varied definition adopted by scholars in the economic science community.
And these two major terms are as follows;
i. Fragile Economy
ii.Credit Analysis & Risk
i. Fragile Economy
It is a term argued to have been coined by Morgan Stanley in 2013, representing emerging
market economies that are too dependent on unreliable foreign investment to finance growth
ambitions. Bruce & Jennifer (2013) defined the fragile economy as a National economic network
to venerable metropolitan economies, consisting of networks of innovative firms, talented
workers, risk-taking entrepreneurs, supportive Institution and associations that cluster together in
metropolitan areas and co-produce economic performance and progress. Demirek (2009), almost
like the intent of the originator of the word, defined a fragile economy as an environment where
firms rely heavily on external funds to finance its operational costs. However in respect to this
paper, fragile economy will be defined as, “an economy, experiencing significant weakness in it
currency, making it difficult to finance it account deficits and growth projects, contributing to a
slow down and vulnerability in it welfare functioning”.There are numerous factors known to
cause economic fragility of a State, for instance, weak political institution, poor constitution
functionality, poor governance, poor financial industrial policies, bad tax regulations, high cost
of having a strong balance sheet as an enterprise, poorly developed investment market, high
inflationary effect, complex bureaucracy, low capital adequacy of banks, and finally in respect of
this paper, corruption. All the listed factors will be extensively diagnosed to establish a
significant contribution to a fragile economy and negative impact on Enterprise existence. Which
will guide in analyzing the effectiveness of the use of Static-credit-risk-analysis for potential
profitable Enterprises that emerge from such economies, which is mostly observed to be
struggling to survive?
3ii. Credit Analysis & Risk
Kagan (2018) defined credit analysis, as a type of analysis that an investor or bond portfolio
manager performs on companies or debt issuing entities, to measure the entity’s ability to meet
its debt obligations. Which the content of this paper, do concur with the above definition to
establish the bases of its theoretical argument. Banks remain a major conduit for the
transformation of Savings into productive investments. And much particular in emerging
countries where capital markets are still not sufficiently developed and where savers have limited
access to direct-credit-risk-opportunities. Jonathan & Philippe (2013) state, Banks and Financial
Systems should share the blame with profligate politicians, outdated socioeconomic models and
a shift of the world’s center of gravity towards newcomers in the financial-economic warfare.
And further argued, Banks cannot survive unless they take risks. The trick for them is to manage
those risks without destroying shareholders value. The fatter the better, from creditworthiness
point of view and without endangering depositors and creditors. It must be acknowledged,
financial intermediaries like Banks do carry substantial credit and market risks. They act as the
shock absorbers by removing it from their depositors’ shoulders and charge a hefty fee for the
services. It is observed, no individual with money to spare, that is Savings or Capital, will
provide a credit on a commercial basis, unless she believes that the borrower has both the
requisite willingness and capacity to repay the funds, advanced. To form such belief rationally,
she must be satisfied that, the two questions can be answered in affirmative. Which are;
a)The prospective borrower will be willing, so long as the obligation exists, to repay it?
b)The prospective borrower will be able to repay the obligation when required under its terms?
To respond to these questions, a credit analyst will re-sought to a judgment of probability. Banks
acceptance of credit risk is inherent to their operations, since the very reason for existence as
banks, is the supply of credit through the advance of cash and the corresponding creation of
financial obligations. Credit Risk in the perspective of this paper will be defined as, “the risk of
money loss arising from the default of a counter-party on a fundamental financial obligation or
higher than expected loss of severity, arising from a lower than expected exposure at the time of
default”. The following is a formulated assessment of credit risk in the framework of this paper
assumed as the generally accepted tradition of the banking industry:
4(a). Examining the obligator’s capacity and willingness to repay credit
(b). The country risk and operational conditions as in its macroeconomic climate that the obliged
is exposed to.
(c).Examining the attributes of obligation from which the credit risk arises in the instance of
legal or derivative risk and character of the currency.
(d).Assessing credit risk and mitigation such as collateral utilization, pledges, guarantees, and
insurance.
The concern herein is not the underlying probability of default but the degree of uncertainty
associated with forecasting this probability. As Hale (1983) succinctly put across, if the
pawnbroker lends money against a gold watch, he does not need credit analysis. He needs
instead to know the price of the gold watch with respect to time. The Traditional Credit analysts
of the banking sector are best known of sieving through a quantum of data ranging from cash
flows, credit history, in its ratio and trend analysis to draw a probability line in terms of exposure
to default, the recovery rate, and the loss has given default. Which this style of credit analysis
modeled as a structural and reduced form is the accepted standards of the Banks. The [structural
model] considers the positions of stakeholders of the company, while the [reduced-form model]
seeks to predict, when a default may occur based on observable variables. Which the proposed
theoretical construct of this paper, in conclusion, seek to critique against the stringent application
of this model in the fragile economy due to it questionable effectiveness and reliability observed
over a decade in such economy as an ex-post study, hence provide the alternative model as a
theoretical perspective.
2. DISCUSSING FACTORS CONSIDERED TO CONTRIBUTE TO FRAGILE ECONOMY
AND POOR ENTERPRISE FUNCTIONING
Even though, there is observed a wide range of factors identified to contribute significantly to the
cause of the fragile economy, this paper narrow the analysis of the observable factors, which
affect a fragile economy as well translate to poor functioning of a productive Enterprises due to
credit accessibility and underdeveloped financial industry. Which are;
5I.Weak Governance and Political Institution
II.Poor constitutional functionality
III.The poorly developed investment market
IV. Bureaucracy
V.Corruption
VI.Banks capital adequacy
I. Weak Governance and Political Institution
It was suggested by Adji et.al (1997) as well as Feng & Chen (1997) that a political government,
which is an active economic participant, can positively intervene to shape an environment to
attract investment. They further argue that lower political capacity, indicate less ability to extract
resources, which critically implies higher budget deficits and an increase in uncertainty. Finally,
they observed that faced with low capacity, a country is more likely to create new taxes or
increase existing ones, thereby reducing the return on investments. Which sum up to the fact that
capable government aligns their policies with sound macroeconomics criteria, while weak
governments stress political survival and mostly exposed to challenges, which act as a huge
frustration to Enterprise survival in such economy. When political Institution formed is captured
as an ideological gloss through which the minority who exercise real power through the State
and it monopoly, seek to conceal this fact from the subject population as Lenin (1917), did put it
in his paper the State and Revolution, then the Institution become hopeless in its function denied
in it expected benefit to its members, than to serve the interest of the political elite. In such a
circumstance, Enterprises not engaging in cronyism, suffocate in a smooth and successful growth
in such an economy as observed from these studies.
II. Poor Constitutional Functionality
In an economic environment, where the legitimacy of the State, the nature of its authority and the
nature of its obligations to its citizens and of its citizens to it, lack clarity, with the constitution
functioning not as the rule of law but the rule of men ruled by subjective and arbitrary will of
6particular men instead of objective determinant of general and public laws, as Kant (1724-1804)
asserted, for a strong constitution, is a union of an aggregate of men under rightful law. In such a
circumstance, the labour of men through their enterprises to serve the market as well as to
generate private property are easily undermined, and mischievously destroyed in the spirit of
plundering, which weaken the spirit of innovation, creativity and sacrifice through
entrepreneurship for economic growth, a major challenge faced by Enterprises in fragile
economy, as observed from this studies.
III. Poor developed Investment Market
Poorly developed investment market could be defined as an economic environment, whereby
either bank-based or market-based financial system is poorly developed in promoting long-run
economic growth. Stiglitz (1985) submit that well-developed markets quickly and publicly reveal
information, which reduces the incentives for individual investors to acquire information. While
Boot et.al (1993) indicate, Banks reveal of information is slow to public due to it long run
relationship with firms, however with Boot & Thakor (1997) added to the debate that, a
coordinated coalitions of investors with Bank is better than uncoordinated with the market,
where monitoring firms and reducing post-lending moral hazards is weak. Bhide (1993) also
posits that liquid markets hold a myopic investor climate, making the bank-based system a
preferable in policy guide and reliable theoretical practice. So in a fragile economy whereby both
the Bank-based and Market-based financial system is underdeveloped, causes visionary
enterprises to struggle in productivity and smooth growth. Further observed from this studies that
in such an environment, investors hold the assumption that, there is a potential high risk to invest
in privates sector of such economy, despite the evidence that the sector is holding the highest
volume of macroeconomic contribution to the performance of the State. And even if, it is
considered by Investors as an environment to support, they then expect it to be politically
guaranteed, a process that slows economic growth and innovations by private hands.
7IV. Bureaucracy
As Niskanen Jr. (1990) argued, a large part of our population wants to expand the role of
government particularly to alleviate poverty and improve the environment, correspondingly large
part of our population is exasperated by the methods of bureaucracy and dissatisfied by its
performance, just as Max Weber (1864-1920) recognized bureaucracy as the characteristic form
of public administration for a State with extended territorial sovereignty developed, what has
become the standard definition of this form of organization in our contemporary times. Von
Mises book ‘bureaucracy’, had established relevant information, he argued, ‘bureaus’ specialized
in the supply of those services, the value of which cannot be exchanged for money at per-unit
rate. As a consequence of the above, ‘bureaus’ cannot be managed by profit goals and the
economic calculus, therefore, must be centrally managed by the pervasive regulation and
monitoring of the activities of subordinates with the absolute solution, to reduce the scope of
government. Enterprise success in both endogenous and exogenous climate of a State depends
much on strategic exploitation of opportunities in respect to time. In an advent of competition,
time become a valuable commodity to take advantage of, which fragile economy drawn in
complex bureaucracy, lacking respect to time and speed of the market development as a result of
a system architecturally designed to serve self-interest and political elite, downplaying the
struggle of an entrepreneurs effectiveness and Enterprise efficiency is observed to be the major
cause of venture collapsing in such economies.
V. Corruption
Olken & Pande (2012) posits that, survey evidence suggests that corruption is rampant in the
developing world and more prevalent in developing countries than in rich ones and justify further,
there is a situation where ‘bureaucrats’ official salaries were less than their market wage in
expectation of the corrupt rents, they would obtain. Mocan (2008) finds that the income and
education of the individual have positive impacts on the likelihood of being asked for a bribe in
developing countries. There are an Instances, reported by Reinikka & Svensson (2004), using
public expenditure tracking survey, they compared the amount of special education block grant
sent down from the Central government of Uganda, with the amount of the Block grant received
by the schools. They estimated a leakage rate of 87%. Another instance, which Olken (2007)
8report of a rural road project. He compares the official amount spent on the road to an
independent engineers, estimate of what the road actually cost to build, in which engineers dug
core sample of the roads to estimate material quantities, did price surveys to estimate local prices,
and interviewed villagers to estimate actual wages paid, it was realized, some amount of
materials disappeared during construction. And an estimated missing expenditure in respect of
the village claim and the engineering estimation to the promoted cost was approximately 24%
per average. Olken & Pande (2012) did further argue that corruption lessens the government’s
ability to correct an externality. If someone can bribe a police officer or a judge instead of paying
an official fine, the marginal cost of breaking the law is reduced from the official fine to the
amount of the bribe. Furthermore argued, if the police officer extracts the same bribe regardless
of whether the person has broken the law, the marginal cost of breaking the law falls to zero, and
the law ceases to have a disincentive effect altogether. An environment which has a strong
network of corruption driven in complex innovations, any honest transactions, which should be
the hallmark of any successful and credible enterprise, becomes difficult, as a result, a long term
progression of such a venture in competing against its counterpart in the strong economic
environment becomes questionable.
VI. Capital Adequacy of Banks
In the studies of Inoue et.al (2019) on lending behaviour of Banks, they submitted, when a
substantial adverse shock hits the economy and many borrowers become insolvent and banks
face impaired capital. There are two types of lending behaviour observed, which are, stagnant
lending in a capital crunch and forbearance lending. With the stagnant lending in a capital crunch,
the banks decrease credit to borrowers, irrespective of whether they are good or bad borrowers.
While that of Forbearance lending, the banks conduct window-dressing to avoid the realization
of capital losses and thus allocate more credit to insolvent borrowers, with the hope that their
situations will improve with also the premise that, the impaired banks adopt this lending
behaviour as a considerable effort to avoid further deterioration of their balance sheets. In
practice, it implies the stagnant lending in a capital crunch involves the issue of overall credit
under-supply to all borrowers. Whereas forbearance lending involves the issue of credit
allocation to low-quality borrowers. As the spirit of this paper seeks to promote a lending model
9very effective in a fragile economy, this does require a very vibrant banking industry.
Diamond (1984) and Calomiris & Wilson (2004) argued that, in the models of banking, under
asymmetric information, to emphasize that the potential conflict of interest, is between the banks
and depositors. And such an informational problem, encourages the banks to offer short-term-
low-risk debt, concentrating mostly on the balance sheet risk of their capital and thus insulating
depositors from this risk. Therefore it is important to determine whether banks are well
capitalized enough to absorb their balance sheet risk and stabilize the banking system. Since the
theoretical proposition of the paper on dynamic-credit-risk analysis and lending is established on
the premise of a vibrant banking sector of a fragile economy, this does then promote a debate on
signals of an economy to serve as a predictive power for Banks failure. Haldane (2014) and
Bulow & Klemperer (2015) pointed out that regulatory measures of Bank Capital do not
necessarily have predictive power for Bank failures. Empirically, Haldane & Madouros (2012)
and Sarin and Summers (2016) measured Bank risk using both regulatory measures and market
measures. And realized, the market measures, which is defined as the Capital ratio in the value of
equity relations to total assets has the most explanatory power in predicting banks failure, then
regulatory measures of bank capital in respect to Basel accord. The limitation of this paper was
to ignore the theoretical factors that anchors vibrancy to bank operations in credit-lending within
fragile economy for instance the arguments of Khwaja & Mian (2008) and (Jimens et.al. 2012;
2014) in understanding bank loans level data and firm-level panel data to appreciate the omitted
variable problems in controlling borrower-side factors in bank loan equation but rather relied
squarely on the theoretical pathway for effective credit-lending for a successful industrial
progression. Which we believe further studies in the recommended area, could explore these
factors, metrically.
3. DYNAMIC CREDIT RISK ANALYSIS & LENDING MODEL
This section of the paper seeks to analyzed the existing model of credit-risk-analysis termed as
Model ‘E’ by this paper and establish the empirical evidence of it inefficiency in fragile
economy and the proposition of an upgraded model termed by this paper as Model ‘D’ to address
the weaknesses of model ‘E’ application in fragile economy. In the theoretical settings of model
‘E’, it is observed per practical experience that, the tool is applicable to Enterprises, observed to
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have a historic operational existences in an economy, hence used three (3yrs) as the average data
qualification used by the financial industry as a criteria for credit application and approval. And
then followed with other risk-metric assessment and quantification. Enterprise chosen to be
analyzed on the scale of probability in credit-risk-analysis is expected to meet at least the four
major required criteria outlined below as parametric conditions;
i. The Enterprise is assured of profitability for short, medium and long term
ii. The Enterprise has passed credibility test
iii. The Enterprise has a successful historical data of operational performance.
iv.The Management credibility and integrity test
When those parameters are met, then the actual Credit risk analysis of the Banks of the Financial
Institution is generally observed to follow the model below in a diagram format, defined by the
paper as ‘Static Credit Analysis’.
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Fig. A1. Model ‘E’
E. T. Senzu (2019), Credit-Lending- risk analysis model structure
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The efficiency of Model ‘E’, passing through an empirical and evaluation test as an Old Static
Banking approach in credit-risk-analysis, experimented in the following chosen countries, as a
sample frame for the idealized fragile economies, were,
1. Ghana
2.Nigeria
3.Uganda
4. Liberia
5.Zimbabwe
A total of two hundred (200) companies were engaged, all within this five chosen countries as a
case study approach in respect to Best and Kaln (1998), as they argue that, case study probes
deeply and analyzed interactions between factors that explain present status or influence change.
The size of the sample, which was two hundred (200) companies, was believed by the researcher
as sufficient enough to be a good inference as Fink and Kosecoff (1995) posts, the size of a
population from which the sample of a particular size is drawn has virtually no impact on how
well a sample is likely to describe a population. Finally, Fowler (1993) did also assert, a sample
size of one hundred and fifty (150) respondents could describe a population of fifteen thousand
(15,000) or five hundred million (5,000,000) with virtually the same degree of accuracy,
assuming all other aspects of the design and sampling procedure were the same.
This two hundred (200) companies selected were based on their interest for Credit facility within
the period when the research study was conducted and the research by favour had access to their
data of credit application in the period of 2018 October to 2019, February from the Financial
Institutions of their choice, with their request processed at the time when the research studies was
still on-going. Therefore Figure A2 below, define the structural component of the Enterprises
surveyed as a sample frame of the population
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Fig. A2
E. T. Senzu, 2019; field Report
To be able to complete the empirical testing of the efficiency of Model ‘E’ in the chosen fragile
economies, the following question was asked
Q1. How many of the companies, had their credit facility approved among the two hundred
companies who applied for it? The findings were tabled as Table X1
Table X1
E. T. Senzu, 2019; field Report.
A total of two hundred (200) companies, which applied for the credit facility as a 100% sample
framework, with the response presented above. It was observed, only 15% out of the two
hundred (200) loan applications were considered for credit facility approval, by going through
Types of Companies Percentage of Company Size (%) Granted Credit Facility (%)
Corporate Companies &
Multinationals 8% 4%
Medium Scale Enterprise 27% 8%
Small Scale Enterprise 41% 3%
Micro Scale Enterprise 24% 0%
100% 15%
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Model ‘E’ Credit-Risk-Analysis and Lending framework, as it has always been, per the
traditional banking approach. This empirically, justify the argument of the paper on the
inefficiency of the use of Model ‘E’ diagram, shown above, as a credit-risk-analytical approach
for a fragile economy, 100% request of loans only 15% qualified per the approach used for the
credit-risk-analysis. To further examine the cause of its weakness as a traditional credit-risk-
analytical banking model, another question was asked to the respondents.
Q2. Why were you disqualified, despite meeting the parametric conditions stated above, as the
Enterprise being profitable, credible and has historical data of operational performance and
competent management of high repute?
Findings were tablized as X2, below.
Table X2.
Reasons behind Credit disqualification
E. T. Senzu, 2019; field report
Even though at the exposure to the empirical evidence, it indicated the targeted respondents had more
than one reason to be denied of credit facility by these banks, however, the study rather dwells much on
the core factor among the list of factors in respect to the companies to be denied the credit facility. With
these studies, it has empirically justified, that most of the causes, resulting to disqualification of
Enterprises credit accessibility, falls within Model ‘E’ framework in Credit-Risk-Analysis, which the
paper seeks to advance this model theoretically into an ideal Model ‘D’ framework of Credit-Risk-
Response Rate
1
Credit history suffered discrepancies with the reason of most, to avoid
tax burden 34%
2
A weak economic environment due to weak governance
capacity 22%
3 Weak collateralization and guarantors 12%
4
High Interest rate, making the credit facility dis-
interesting 15%
5 Unreliable location of the Enterprises 2%
85%
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Analysis, which is proposed to be an efficient tool for a fragile economy to the benefit of Enterprise
developers in such regions. With the Model ‘D’ framework designed below as Fig. A3
Fig. A3.
Senzu (2019) Model D- Credit-Lending-risk analysis structure
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The above Model ‘D’ as shown by Fig. A3 as a Credit-Risk-Analysis and Lending tool is upheld
as dynamic and relatively efficient in its structural implementation comparable to Model ‘E’ as
shown in Fig. A1, because it takes into consideration the triggers of a fragile economy that
counter a smooth and innovative growth of Enterprises of such economy under financial
constraint. The Model ‘D’ stresses its analytical tool on the parametric qualification of the
Enterprises, if such are met, whatever identified risk, will mitigate it for easy credit accessibility
for Enterprise progressive functioning. However, the weakness of Model ‘D’ Credit risk-analysis
and lending, is its inability to asses start-up ventures having zero years of historical performance.
Which the paper further postulate Model ‘S’ to replace Model ‘D’ in Enterprise funding, when
the Venture is in a quixotic stage. For a State to adopt Model ‘S’, then the government of such a
fragile economy, should have an interest of private sector empowerment as an engine of its
economic growth, while it innovatively channel most of its graduate students into
entrepreneurship; then the proposed model ‘S’ designed below to address credit-risk-analysis and
lending will require a central Institution termed as [SME-EXIM-BANK] enacted by Law in it
operational existence, with its source of funding generated by Public-Private-Partnership (PPP)
to guide successful implementation of the model. Then the ultimate parametric qualification of
venture proposal is to prove the significant contribution of such an idealized venture impacts on
Gross domestic production (GDP) of such economy when projects risk analysis is carefully
analyzed and quantified. Then with the model ‘S’ framework shown below as Fig. A4 will be
applicable.
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Fig.4 Model ‘S’
E. T. Senzu (2019) model ‘S’ credit-lending-risk analysis structure
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4. RELEVANCY OF STUDIES
Over the years there is a general impression created by the literature of political economy of
developing countries, arguing in favour of the supremacy of the fiscal policies being an effective
tool of government, dictating the success of a welfare state. Which this paper seeks to critique
the exuberant of such ideological positioning and prove that, beyond fiscal policy interventions
of government, an exceptional attention of government need to be paid on vibrancy of it Banking
system in the area of credit lending to Enterprises in fragile economies or else the hope of a
welfare state will fail as time elapses, which is justified below, mathematically.
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It is assumed that in any fragile Economy with an observed constant government fiscal policy
approach as an intervention to economic market performance instead of a supposedly free-
market functioning towards equilibrium will be defined with constant (GP), then the below
equation is believed to hold as follows,
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Eq.4 and Eq.5 inserted into Eq.3 to produce Eq.6 and Eq.7
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The final derivation concludes and justify that, for every welfare state, beyond government fiscal
policy intervention, it requires a well-capitalized Banking system, strong purchasing power of
currency, a good wage rate and high credit lending rate as proven by the equation (7), which
comes with a quality credit-lending-models to be used by the banks. Such has been the focus of
this paper, specifically on crediting-lending-models very effective as a theoretical proposed
model to be adopted by banks in fragile economies.
5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
There are three models, which the paper have presented, beginning with the old traditional
Credit-risk-analysis and lending approach adopted generally by the Financial Industry, mostly
the banking sector, with the first model framework defined by this paper as Model ‘E’ with it the
weakness of application explored when experimented in fragile economies. As a result, the paper
further postulated an advanced version of the credit-risk-analysis and lending of model ‘E’ and
termed it as Model ‘D’ and ‘S’ framework, exhibited above for efficient application in fragile
economy, depending on the ‘life-span’ of the venture, either three (3) years or more of
productive existence, and Zero (0) year productive existence in other words, a venture in an
idealistic stage, for the Banks to resort to the use of Model-S’ and ‘D’ instead of ‘E’ model
analysis framework for credit lending. These additional models developed theoretically, is to
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help widen the risk analytics and assessment scope of Enterprises in accessing funds in fragile
economy, unlike the straight-jacket-approach, which denied most potential and successful
ventures that opportunity to prove itself, how much it worth and the viability in both the short,
medium and long term productivity, due to financial constraint.
The researcher does recommend, any further research in this area of studies should focus on
lending behaviours of Banks in a fragile economy, approach and methods to improve its potency
and sustainability.
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